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RECENT CASE COMMENTS
CONTRACTS FOR THE BENmT OF THIRD P.ERsoNs - LIABILTY
OF INSURER ON MALPRACTICE POLICY TO INJURED PARTY. - H, a

physician, was covered by a group policy of insurance which provided that the insurance company would upon notice defend and
indemnify each assured against loss and expense arising out of
claims for damages on account of any malpractice alleged to have
been committed during the policy period; and that the insolvency
or bankruptcy of the assured would not relieve the company from
any payment for which it would otherwise be liable under the
policy; and if, because of the insolvency or barfkruptcy, an execution on a judgment recovered against the assured be returned unsatisfied, the judgment creditor should have tlhe right to recover
the amount of the judgment against the company to the same extent that the assured would have had to recover had he paid the
judgment. In an action by plaintiff against H he was found to
be guilty of malpractice and a judgment rendered against him, defendant company appearing to defend H. Execution on judgment
against H was returned unsatisfied because H had gone into bankruptcy. Plaintiff instituted action under the West Virginia statute
entitling sole beneficiaries to sue at law. Held, that plaintiff was
a creditor beneficiary and tlerefore not authorized to sue at law.
Aetna Life Insurance Company of Hartford Conn. v. Maxwell.'
Contrary to the view prevalent in England and Massachusetts,
most American courts have taken the view that the party in interest may maintain an action in his own name upon a contract made
for his benefit.2 In West Virginia this right is statutory3 but extends only to sole beneficiary contracts.4 The fact that H was a
bankrupt is misleading, in that at first blush it would seem that
the plaintiff is the sole beneficiary, since H's liability to plaintiff
has already been discharged. But the fact that the debt is barred
by the Statute of Limitations or by a discharge in bankruptcy will
not operate to make a creditor beneficiary a sole beneficiary, for
189 F. (2d) 988 (C. C. A. 4th, 1937).
2 Ohio Casualty Ins. Co. v. Beckwith, 74 F. (2d) 75 (C. C. A. 5th, 1934);
Meyer v. National Surety Co., 90 N. J. L. 126, 100 AtI. 164 (1917); Glen v.
Ins. Co., 56 N. Y. 379 (1874); Ruohs v. Traders' Fire Ins. Co., 111 Tenn. 405,
78 S. W. 85 (1903).
SVW. VA. RBu. CODE (Miehie, 1937) c. 55, art. 8, § 12.
4 Criss v. United States F. & G. Co., 105 W. Va. 380, 142 S. E. 849 (1928)
State v. Royal Indemnity Co., 99 W. Va. 277, 128 S. E. 439 (1925).
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the debtor, even though a bankrupt, has an interest in seeing his
debt paid.'
However, the creditor beneficiary, if plaintiff can be found to
be such, is not denied relief in equity in West Virginia. The courts
have been indefinite in their tests for ascertaining what beneficiaries
fall within the protected types, but it is well settled that an incidental beneficiary is not entitled to relief by virtue of the promises
in the contract.' It is commonly said that the beneficiary entitled
to relief must be a third person whom the contracting parties "in7
tend" shall receive a "direct benefit" from the promise. The
case of Lawrence v. Fox8 has probably had more influence than
any other in strengthening the theory that a creditor beneficiary
has a "direct right" on a contract made by the privies thereto to
discharge the promisee's obligation. Here, however, some distinction must be made and the contract looked at closely, for it is
well settled that a mere promise by the insurer to indemnify
against loss does not give the injured party a right to sue on the
contract. In such a case the promisee himself has no right of
action until he has suffered loss or expense, hence one claiming
damages by virtue of a derivative right can assert no claim against
the promisor. 9 On the other hand, it is generally held that if an
intent can be legitimately shown to give the third party a right,
that intent should be given effect.10 Here, obviously the requisite
intent is shown by a clause in the policy which expressly provides
that the party injured by malpractice, in case his claim is not satisfied, shall have a direct right to sue on the policy. But this same
clause created a condition precedent which was binding upon the
plaintiff for the courts are all in accord that, if the promise is
conditional the beneficiary, like the immediate contracting parties,
acquires his rights only upon the performance or happening of the
condition. 1' Plaintiff satisfied the condition by bringing his action
against I, thus determining the loss suffered. The fact that plain(1932) § 133.
6 Id. § 147.
72 WnLISTON, CONTRACTS (2d ed. 1936) § 356A and cases cited.
s 20 N. Y. 268 (1859).
9 Nat. City Bank v. Berwin, 240 App. Div. 550, 270 N. Y. S. 678 (1934);
Embler v. Hartford, etc. Co., 158 N. Y. 431, 53 N. E. 212 (1899); 2 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 403.
10 Malley v. American Indemnity Corp., 297 Pa. 216, 146 Atl. 571 (1929),
81 A. L. R. 1322 (1932); Portland, etc. Co. v. Globe Co., 301 Pa. 132, 151 Atl.
687 (1930) ; Fentress v. Rutledge, 140 Va. 685, 125 S. E. 668 (1924).
5 RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS

,i RESTATEFENT, CONTRACTS § 136.
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WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY
tiff was undetermined at the time the contract was entered into was
also an obstacle to his claim after his status had been -determined.
But it is settled that if the beneficiary satisfies the other requisites
entitling him to sue it does not matter that he is not named in the
contract, and the fact that he is not known at the time of the
making of.the contract is immaterial. He may even be one of a
2
class of persons, if the class is sufficiently designated.1
The result in Aetna Life Insurance Company of Hartford
Conn. v. Maxwell is correct beyond a doubt. The rules of law governing the status of the plaintiff were clearly against his claim as
a sole beneficiary, and the case adds clarity to the proposition.
H. G. W.
INTERNAL REVENUE -

ADIINISTAVE LAW -

FINALITY OF

The stockholders of X
corporation, contemplating a sale of the entire stock of X, organize
a dummy corporation, Y, to which some of the assets of X are
transferred. After the sale, the former stockholders of X, now
stockholders of Y, vote that Y make a "gift or honorarium" to
former employees of X. The commissioner of internal revenue
treated the amount received by B, one of the former employees of
X, as taxable income. This payment was likewise held by the
Board of Tax Appeals to be "compensation," taxable as income,
and not a tax-exempt "gift." ' The circuit court of appeals (one
judge dissenting) upheld the finding of the Board,2 and the
Supreme Court granted certiorari.3 Held (four justices dissenting), that the ultimate finding that this payment constituted compensation involved a question of law, or at least a mixed question
of law and fact, and the Court could look into all the circumstances
and substitute its judgment for that of the Board of Tax Appeals.
Judgment reversed. Bogardus v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue.4
The Revenue Act of 1924, which created the Board of Tax Appeals,5 provided for no appeal from the Board; the result being
that a proceeding before this administrative tribunal was considered
FINDINGS OF TBE BOARD OF TAX ArEA.Ls.-

12 Burton v. Larkin, 36 Kan. 246, 13 Pac. 398 (1887) ; Lemz v. Chicago,
etc.
R. Co., 111 Wis. 198, 86 N. W. 607 (1901); RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 139.
145 STAT. 798 (1928), 26 U. S. C. A. § 22 (b) (3).
2Bogardus v. Helvering, 88 P. (2d) 646 (C. C. A. 2d, 1937).
3 57 S. Ct. 790 (1937).
4 58 S. Ct. 61, 5 U. S. L. Week 203 (1937).
r543 STAT. 336 (1924), 26 U. S. C. A. § 600.
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